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PURSUING DIVERSITY: FROM EDUCATION TO EMPLOYMENT
Amy L. Wax
A core ideal of Anglo-American law is that legal wrongs should be
remedied by restoring the injured victim to the “rightful position.”
That position is defined as the one the victim would have occupied had
the legal injury never been inflicted. This aspiration has exerted a
powerful influence on American legal practice across the board.
Although, curiously, the phrase “rightful position” barely figures in
cases or executive orders applying federal civil-rights laws, the
restorative imperative embodied in that concept has exerted an
important influence on their administrative and judicial application.
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
question loomed large of how to define the “rightful position” for the
targets of unlawful discrimination, exclusion, and ill treatment, and
especially for Blacks. What should be the touchstone for full correction,
and thus racial justice? The answer that soon took hold was that
Blacks would occupy the same social, educational, and occupational
positions as Whites. Perhaps the closest to a formal expression of this
concept was President Lyndon B. Johnson’s famous speech at Howard
University articulating as the goal of the federal civil-rights laws not
just “equality as a right and a theory,” but “equality as a fact and
equality as a result.”
The “equality as a fact” benchmark necessarily raised the question
of how to achieve that result for victims of racial bias and
discrimination. A consensus grew that the desired outcome demanded
more than the legal command to stop discriminating. Reversing and
undoing the lingering vestiges of past wrongs would be required. This
in turn would call for the adoption of race-conscious measures across
multiple domains. As Justice Harry Blackmun stated in Bakke v.
Regents of the University of California in 1978, “In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.” The
practice of affirmative action, or reverse discrimination, was born of
this idea.
Although specific, limited, and targeted race-conscious remedies
were not hard to reconcile with established legal-equitable principles,
formidable obstacles existed—political, doctrinal, and practical—to the
aggressive pursuit of “equality of result” through the systematic use of
race preferences. Much of the public remained wedded to
individualist, impartial ideals of meritocratic selection that tolerated
expanded opportunities but resisted “hard” measures like racial quotas
or racial proportionality. Retrofitting remedial doctrines designed to
redress well-defined, individual injuries to more nebulous group harms
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proved controversial and perplexing. Courts grappled with whether
specific proof of discrimination, as opposed to vague allegations of
societal racism, should be required. They also considered whether
race-conscious orders could properly be imposed on entities never
demonstrated to violate the law or in favor of persons never shown to
have suffered actual discrimination. On the practical level, the
“rightful position” project was stymied by entrenched customs, outright
resistance, and Blacks’ lack of readiness to step into a full range of
social and economic roles due to poor education and skills. Attempts to
grapple with these realities produced policies of mixed efficacy and a
tangle of conflicting and confusing court decisions.
Confounding this project in the important employment realm was a
Civil Rights Act provision, Section 703(j) of Title VII, that disavowed
any requirement that an employer “grant preferential treatment to
any individual or to any group” due to racial imbalances in the
workplace. The executive branch, in enforcing the law, effectively
ignored and repeatedly flouted the clause’s limitations by demanding
that businesses and other employing entities address lopsided racial
representation regardless of whether discrimination was shown to be
the cause. In The Affirmative Action Puzzle, a recent history of
affirmative action, Melvin Urofsky quotes an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) staff member’s statement from the
1970s that his agency treated the antipreference bar in the statute as
“a big zero a nothing, a nullity. [It doesn’t] mean anything to us.”
Accordingly, the EEOC and an expanding network of federal offices
and agencies proceeded to impose on businesses, corporations, and
educational institutions ever more intrusive and onerous
requirements, including hiring quotas, targets, and timetables as well
as massive paperwork and documentation.
Judicial practice was more equivocal. Through a welter of fractured
rulings in employment, business set-asides, and education, the courts
and the Supreme Court established a set of rules permitting some
types of race-conscious remedial orders to rectify proven statutory
violations, and at times allowing voluntary affirmative-action
programs in the absence of adjudicated legal infractions. Judicially
crafted limitations on such programs included the requirements of
showing some evidence of past or present discrimination beyond
statistical imbalances, avoiding inflexible quotas and numerical
targets, tailoring race-conscious measures as narrowly as possible, and
applying them only temporarily. These strictures were not always
consistently applied, which created uncertainty for economic actors
subject to their mandates.
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The early affirmative-action cases were primarily about jobs and
businesses. By the 1990s, the action had shifted decisively to education
and a new justification for race-conscious measures entered the
picture: diversity. Initially developed within academia itself, that idea
was put forward in Justice Lewis Powell’s famous concurring opinion
in the 1978 case of Bakke, which struck down a quota-based
affirmative-action plan at the University of California at Davis Medical
School. Justice Powell suggested that, even if rigid quotas were legally
verboten, race-based educational selection could be justified as a device
to create a diverse student body. Being exposed to students from
various backgrounds carried pedagogical value and enhanced the
educational experience. It followed that creating student diversity,
which delivered those benefits, was a goal that was “compelling”
enough to overcome the law’s colorblind imperatives. Powell cited as
exemplary the flexible, individualized admission protocol at Harvard
College, which used race as one factor among many to craft a class
representing a range of backgrounds, talents, and experiences.
Diversity quickly became the central pillar of the Supreme Court’s
educational affirmative-action jurisprudence, with a majority of the
Court officially recognizing educational diversity as justifying some
degree of race-conscious student selection. At the same time, the Court
imported the prior touchstones of a bar on rigid quotas and the
expectation of narrow tailoring of racial methods. Although appearing
to place genuine limits on the use of affirmative action in the
educational setting, several aspects of the Supreme Court’s key rulings
on the issue, including Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and the Fisher line
of cases (Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher I (2013) and Fisher II
(2016)) gave universities wide discretion to structure their admissions
criteria pretty much as they wished. These included the open-ended
and ill-defined nature of diversity, its elevation to a constitutional
“compelling interest,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s language in
Grutter deferring to educational “expert” judgment, and the Court’s
repeated failure to demand specific evidence of diversity’s actual
benefits and efficacy. This situation earned scathing contempt from
Justice Antonin Scalia, who repeatedly questioned university officials
and other supposed educational “experts” averments of the value of
diversity and regarded the elevation of that “compelling interest” as a
pretext for the Court’s imposition of its political preferences.1
Justice O’Connor famously stated in her plurality opinion in
Grutter that she expected that affirmative action would no longer be
See Amy L. Wax, Trust Me, I’m an Expert: Scientific and Legal Expertise in
Scalia’s Jurisprudence, in Scalia’s Constitution (Paul E. Peterson & Michael
W. McConnell, eds. 2018).
1
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needed after twenty-five years. Albeit well-meaning, Justice
O’Connor’s statement represents a misunderstanding of the
implications and import of the Court’s adoption of diversity rather
than remediation as the centerpiece of educational affirmative-action
jurisprudence. O’Connor’s prediction is grounded in the logic of
remediation and thus unavoidably informed by the “rightful position”
idea. The logic of rightful position remediation dictates that proper
remedies—and especially those that deviate from and go beyond the
law’s mandates—can be justified only if they are designed eventually
to achieve the promised result, which is to undo the injuries inflicted
by a wrong. The objective of race-conscious measures to correct the
wrongs of racial discrimination is to enable Blacks to catch up with
other groups to the point where they can compete by dint of their own
efforts and take their rightful place in society under their own steam.
Once that point is reached and the damage fully undone, affirmative
action will no longer be needed. But diversity as the main rationale for
race-consciousness provides no reason to believe that affirmative
action will reach that end point. Diversity neither promises nor
requires group uplift or equalization. It rests on the educational value
of Blacks’ institutional presence, not on the promise of undoing past
harms or making Blacks as capable, academically or otherwise, as
other groups. Diversity, unlike remediation, thus entails no prediction
that affirmative action will someday be unnecessary and will be
phased out. Although the point seems not to have been fully
appreciated by Justice O’Connor or by those who repeat Justice
O’Connor’s famous mantra, identifying diversity as the main rationale
for educational affirmative action is fully compatible with affirmative
action in perpetuity.
Continuing social and educational trends reaffirm “affirmative
action forever” as the most realistic future scenario. Despite the initial
exuberance of the Civil Rights era, it has become increasingly clear
that the holy grail of steady racial progress towards “equality in fact”
has remained elusive across multiple domains. More broadly, the high
hopes surrounding race preferences in education and other arenas to
effect enough social and economic progress in the Black community to
close existing gaps have not been realized. Blacks as a group continue
to suffer disproportionately from poverty, high crime rates, family
breakdown, and low male workforce participation. In the education
sphere specifically, Blacks on average still lag behind Whites and
Asian Americans in standard measures of learning, ability, and
academic proficiency, such as national K–12 achievement tests, SATs,
LSATs, MCATS, and GREs. Observed differences are pervasive: even
controlling for socioeconomic status and factors such as family income,
school quality, and neighborhood residence, Blacks underperform other
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groups academically, often by a significant margin, in virtually every
public-school district in the United States. Average differences
translate into a stark undercount of Blacks in the higher academic
ranks nationwide. This means that, without affirmative action, Blacks
will be severely underrepresented at competitive and selective
institutions that rely heavily on standard measures of academic ability
and achievement.
Whatever the etiology of existing disparities—and factors such as
racism, poverty, culture, and innate group differences have been
cited—they have proved highly resistant to elimination or even
enduring narrowing through instruments of law and policy. Little
progress has been made in the past few decades towards closing
observed racial gaps in multiple dimensions despite the widespread
adoption of affirmative action in educational programs as well as in
other sectors. These are the realities on the ground that continue to
make affirmative action necessary for generating a so-called “critical
mass” of Blacks in selective universities. In sum, current developments
belie Justice O’Connor’s prediction that affirmative action will
eventually be phased out some time soon.
I. CHALLENGES WITH PRIORITIZING DIVERSITY
In the meanwhile, the shift from remediation to diversity as the
central doctrinal rationale for educational affirmative action has had
several practical and legal consequences in light of important social
changes that have occurred. In recent decades, a surge in immigration
has produced unprecedented levels of demographic diversity. The
growing numbers of potential students from a variety of ethnicities,
backgrounds, and identity groups are in a position to contribute to the
diversity of educational institutions. Although the situation is
complex, the great majority of these groups have more or less
surpassed American-born Blacks in achievement, income, employment
participation, and occupational status. By enhancing the salience of
some groups’ relative success in light of difficult circumstances and
hardships, the diversity goal has threatened to draw attention away
from the civil-rights focus on Blacks’ plight and to dilute Blacks’
primacy as uniquely deserving. And the increasingly multicultural
landscape has also thrown into renewed relief the ongoing and
seemingly recalcitrant educational deficits in the Black community and
the failure of decades of public and private initiatives to close existing
racial gaps.
The pressure to maintain what is considered a desirable student
mix, including a significant presence of relatively underperforming
Blacks and Hispanics in the face of growing competition, especially
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from Asian Americans, has induced universities to become both more
aggressive and less forthright about their emphasis on race relative to
other conventional academic factors in their admissions practices.
This has elicited backlash in the form of proposed referenda and
legislative initiatives at the state level to curtail the use of race by
public universities in admissions and other programs. Some of these
have succeeded. More recently, efforts to reduce race preferences have
taken the form of legal action, including a high-profile lawsuit by an
Asian-American advocacy group claiming that Harvard University
discriminates against Asian Americans in its admissions process in
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The Justice Department
Civil Rights Division also just commenced an investigation of Yale
University. Although the Division’s August 2020 letter questioning
Yale’s admissions practices stopped short of declaring that race could
never be taken into account, it argued that Yale violated Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act by routinely making race a “determinative factor” in
its admissions decisions and by applying a hard, quota-like limit on the
number of Asian-American students at the school.
Both legal challenges face uphill battles. The Supreme Court, in its
main affirmative-action precedents, has given universities permission
to make use of race as a factor in pursuit of the compelling goal of
student demographic diversity. Put another way, the Court has
effectively issued a license to discriminate based on race in favor of
some groups—most notably Blacks and Hispanics—that would
otherwise be underrepresented at their institutions based on
conventional academic criteria. But it is an undeniable fact that the
places available at the most competitive and desirable institutions are
limited relative to the number of applicants seeking them. That means
that freeing up places for Blacks and Hispanics (to achieve a “critical
mass” of those student categories) necessarily entails admitting fewer
students from higher-achieving groups—including Whites and
especially Asian Americans. This can only be done by holding such
groups to higher academic standards and reducing their likelihood of
gaining admission relative to other applicants. In Glenn Loury’s
words, this is “simple logic.” In sum, the affirmative-action practices
the Supreme Court permits will inexorably and necessarily result in
discrimination against students from some groups at selective schools.
This unavoidable equation means that Harvard University’s official
litigation position that it does not practice bias against AsianAmerican applicants is not only unnecessary under existing
jurisprudence, but also illogical and transparently implausible. These
points were not completely lost on Allison Borroughs, the district judge
on the Harvard case. In ruling in the university’s favor, she effectively
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acknowledged that the law allows Harvard to impose more exacting
academic requirements on Asian-American applicants, and to reject a
higher percentage of Asian Americans than Blacks, to achieve the allimportant goal of undergraduate racial diversity. In other words,
Harvard can discriminate against Asian Americans to the degree
necessary to achieve what the school regards as a sufficiently diverse
student body. The clear implication is that, absent more restrictive
rules (such as might exist under state law) than the Supreme Court
has imposed, similar complaints against other competitive universities
are also unlikely to succeed. Unless universities dramatically change
their admissions practices—for example by downgrading or
abandoning conventional merit-based metrics such as the SAT, which
is already happening in some places—the juggernaut of affirmative
action and its double standards will continue apace.
Nonetheless, there are scenarios under which Harvard could still
lose its case on appeal or in the Supreme Court (should it arrive there).
Although taking account of race is precisely what Supreme Court
precedent allows, the Court has articulated limits on the methods that
can be used and the weight that can be assigned to race to achieve
demographic balance. These limits furnish a potential basis for finding
that Harvard has gone too far (as the Justice Department alleges Yale
has done) under existing precedent. But even if the Supreme Court
demands that Harvard curtail or modify its practices, the most likely
outcome is that the university will still be allowed to limit the number
of Asian-American (and/or White) undergraduates as a necessary step
to freeing up spaces for Black and Hispanic students. Race preferences
will continue to be part of the admissions equation.
Alternatively, albeit improbably, the Supreme Court could elect to
use the Harvard case to tighten up significantly on its existing
doctrine. One promising avenue would be to follow the suggestion, in
concurring and dissenting opinions in past affirmative-action cases,
that the Court abandon its deference to education “experts” by
scrutinizing claims made on behalf of diversity more carefully and by
adopting more exacting standards for evaluating its supposed
educational benefits. The Court could demand that universities
precisely identify, measure, and demonstrate superior outcomes from
diverse educational settings. A useful natural experiment is presented
by secondary schools such as the Bronx High School of Science and the
Stuyvesant High School in New York City, and the Thomas Jefferson
High School of Science and Technology in Fairfax County, Virginia.
All of these schools are required by law to admit students solely on the
basis of a competitive exam, with race-conscious selection verboten.
This process has recently produced a student population that is
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overwhelmingly Asian, with a miniscule number of Blacks and
Hispanics. Is there any indication that the students at these schools
learn less or otherwise suffer academically in palpable and
demonstrable ways compared to those who attend schools with a
greater demographic range of students? That is the type of question
that the courts should be asking. In general, the burden should be on
the universities seeking to defend their affirmative-action practices to
show with specificity whether and how a more varied demographic
profile advances pedagogical effectiveness.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
The discussion so far has focused chiefly on affirmative action in
the educational context, which is an area that has commanded
outsized attention from the courts and legal commentators. What
about affirmative action in the workplace? Recent events may prompt
renewed interest in that topic. National soul-searching in the wake of
the death of George Floyd in police hands has spawned a raft of
pledges by companies, firms, corporations, foundations, and other
“woke” organizations to increase the numbers of underrepresented
minorities in their staff ranks, with some even promising to achieve
percentage targets and goals reminiscent of job quotas. The
centerpiece of the “antiracist” initiatives undertaken by this growing
list is a commitment to creating a more diverse workplace. Although
not expressly disavowing remediation, public pronouncements have
repeatedly emphasized the prime importance of enhancing workplace
“diversity, equity, and inclusion” to reflect the profile of groups in
society as a whole, and especially to increase Blacks’ presence in the
full array of jobs from top to bottom.
The shift from remediation to diversity in the rhetoric of workplace
affirmative action, which recapitulates what has occurred in education,
can be understood as proceeding from similar real-world conditions,
disappointments, and failures. The “rightful position” measure of
racial justice proceeds from the expectation that the temporary use of
race preferences will eventually enable Blacks to compete effectively
and to qualify, without a race-conscious boost, for the range of jobs and
occupational positions in proportion to their numbers. As in the
education sphere, that employment goal has so far proved elusive.
Decades after the enactment the Civil Rights Act, and in spite of a
plethora of policies, programs, and initiatives across an array of
domains, race-based preferences are still necessary in order to
maintain a significant Black presence in many workplace positions,
and especially in the most demanding, remunerative, and skillintensive. Given the profile of qualifications of Blacks as compared to
other groups in society, there is no indication that “equity,” as it has
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now come to be designated (which means equal outcomes), can be
achieved without continuing race-conscious interventions and every
reason to believe these will be needed indefinitely.
The emphasis on diversity can be seen as an adjustment to this
reality. As in the case of education, embracing diversity as the
principal rationale for race preferences in employment does not entail
the expectation that race-conscious personnel practices will be or can
be phased out in the foreseeable future. The workplace is facing
“affirmative action forever.”
III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE GOAL OF INCREASING
“DIVERSITY” TO JUSTIFY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE WORKPLACE
Renewed efforts to increase racial diversity in employment to the
point of achieving proportional representation and “racial equity” raise
important legal and practical questions. As Melvin Urofsky notes, the
Supreme Court has declined to forbid voluntary, private race-conscious
affirmative action programs under Title VII, despite explicit language
in the statute that would seem to place them off-limits in many cases,
and despite the Court’s own repeated, albeit erratic, endorsement of
the need for narrow tailoring and proof of specific infractions under
longstanding remedial conventions and doctrines. In United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber (1979), as Urofsky explains, Justice
William Brennan’s majority opinion “somehow managed to find that
the explicit wording of Title VII prohibiting racial discrimination did
not foreclose [a] private race-conscious affirmative action plan[ ]” so
long as the plan was “transitional in nature . . . designed to correct
statistical imbalances . . . and allowed flexibility in hiring nonminorities.” The Court did not justify its permission in that case on
specific findings of past discrimination by the employer or union that
implemented the plan. Rather, it relied on the generalized remedial
goal of “eliminat[ing] present and future discrimination” as well as
“wip[ing] out the burden of past discrimination.” Because that objective
was within the “spirit of the authors of the Civil Rights Act” even if
contrary to its precise terms, the Court permitted the race-conscious
initiative at issue in that case to stand.
The Supreme Court has never expressly repudiated or overruled
Weber, but it is unclear how the Court would apply it today, especially
in light of its recent embrace of a strict textualist reading of Title VII
in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). Based on this development, the
Court could choose to invoke the colorblind language of Title VII or the
statute’s disavowal of a numerical balancing requirement to severely
curtail Weber, perhaps by limiting race-based hiring to a corrective for
specific instances of proven past or present discrimination. But even if
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the Supreme Court declines to take that course, it is unclear whether
the degree of race-consciousness that employers would need to deploy
in many cases to achieve racial “equity” would satisfy the caveats and
limitations in Weber, including the rejection of quotas and rigid
numerical goals, as well as the requirement, still alive and well, that
affirmative-action programs be transitory in duration.
One important and underappreciated fact that is central to the fate
of the aggressive “racial equity” measures many employers have
promised is that the Supreme Court has never expressly recognized
diversity as a legitimate, let alone compelling, justification for raceconscious decision-making in the employment context. In fact,
education is the only sphere in which the Supreme Court has expressly
acknowledged any legitimate interest in maintaining diversity.
A key question is thus whether the courts would, and should, accept
the goal of enhancing workplace diversity as valid basis for raceconscious personnel decisions. For many reasons, the blanket
permission to advance diversity that the Supreme Court has granted to
higher education, whether defensible or not, should not be extended to
the workplace. Specifically, the courts should refuse to assume that
diversity is desirable enough as a general matter to justify race
preferences in hiring and promotion. Rather, race-conscious decisions
should be permitted only in particular instances where an employer
can specifically demonstrate that creating a more diversified workforce
than would otherwise result without the deliberate use of race
preferences generates net concrete benefits for the enterprise overall in
light of its central mission and purpose. It is far from clear a priori how
commonly such net benefits would result or could be shown. An honest
assessment may sometimes, and maybe often, reveal no identifiable,
tangible, or measurably positive payoffs. Or the downsides of pursuing
something like proportional group representation in the workplace will
outweigh the upsides.
The main reason that the Supreme Court’s educational affirmativeaction jurisprudence should not control in the workplace is that the
two settings are incomparable and serve entirely different purposes.
Schools are sites of teaching, learning, developing human capital, and
preparing young people for constructive citizenship. The “expert”
consensus, upon which the courts have heavily relied, is that exposing
students to people from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds
advances these goals, with the benefits sufficiently substantial and
important to justify race-conscious selection. Moreover, the relatively
narrow and well-defined set of objectives that institutions of higher
education share make it reasonable to assume that a diverse student
body will have similar positive effects on the educational experience
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across the board. (Curiously, though, the Supreme Court has not
extended this assumption to K–12 education.) It therefore makes
sense for the courts to adopt a general rule for race-conscious efforts in
the educational sphere.
But employment is fundamentally different from education. Quite
simply, the purpose of the workplace is not pedagogical. Rather,
employees are hired and paid to do a job, deliver a service, produce a
product, and complete specified tasks. The ordinary expectation is
that their activities will contribute to the employing entity’s
profitability or at least to preserving its solvency. This requires the
efficient and effective operation of the enterprise at issue, and workers
are expected to contribute to that state of affairs. Additionally,
employing entities are much more variable than educational
institutions on dimensions that bear on whether a diverse workforce
and the steps needed to produce and maintain it create a net positive
or negative effect. Although employing organizations share the goal of
economic viability, they vary dramatically in function, purpose, size,
type, and mode of operation. They also present their staff with a
spectrum of job demands and employment situations, ranging from
complex, intricate teamwork to solitary, self-directed production.
Given these realities, it is far from obvious that a diverse set of
workers can be counted on to best serve the objectives of each and
every employer across the entire economy, regardless of the
organization, firm, business, or activity at issue, or the attributes,
availability, and responsibilities of potential workers.
Accordingly, the courts should not assume that achieving workplace
diversity is a “compelling interest” that always justifies a departure
from race-neutral principles. Nor should the judicial acceptance of
demographic diversity as a compelling interest for education
automatically carry over into the employment sphere. Rather, hiring
entities and managers should be required to justify race-conscious
practices for diversity purposes on a case-by-case basis by
demonstrating the concrete benefits of diversifying workforce
composition in their specific operational settings using accepted, welldefined, quantitative metrics like productivity, profits, quality services,
and growth, or other appropriate and precise metrics. Certainly the
courts should not simply defer to employers’ assertions that a more
diverse workforce actually delivers favorable outcomes without clear
evidence of that result.
The employer’s burden will not be easy to carry. It is today widely
assumed that enhancing workforce diversity is an unalloyed positive.
But despite all the feel-good platitudes extolling the virtues of racial,
ethnic, (and gender) mixing in the workplace and repeated invocations
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of the mantra that “diversity is our strength,” the advantages of
creating a more racially and ethnically varied staff, and especially of
increasing the number of workers from underrepresented groups than
would otherwise result from colorblind hiring practices, are speculative
and unproven. The social science on the question is sparse, spotty, and
equivocal, and the results decidedly mixed. Given the paucity and type
of evidence, it is just as plausible to assume that hiring individuals
from similar backgrounds is a better practice, or that workplace
uniformity operates more effectively in many settings. Historical
examples of decidedly undiverse teams producing outstanding results
are not hard to find. The Apollo 11 moon mission was run mostly by
White guys with buzz cuts. They put a man on the moon. Would a
team with significantly more women or minorities have done a better
job? The staff at Bletchley Park who unscrambled the German Enigma
machine and cracked the Nazi secret war code consisted mostly of
young, male, well-educated, Caucasian British citizens.2 Their
successful efforts proved crucial to an Allied victory in World War II.
The highly lucrative Belgian diamond trade has for centuries been
almost entirely run by a small group of Orthodox Jewish merchants
based in Antwerp. None of these examples—and there are many
more—rules out the possibility that more diverse teams would
sometimes do a better job. But whether, when, and under what
circumstances is ultimately an empirical question. A priori
generalizations are baseless, and any determinations on the question
must proceed piecemeal. Moreover, any rigorous assessments must
take into account that, in our increasingly racially and ethnically
mixed country, some degree of diversity will already spontaneously
exist in many jobs and workplaces without race preferences, even if not
strictly proportional to all population groups. This means that the
supposed benefits of the enhanced diversity traceable to such
preferences will, in many cases, be merely incremental.
Also essential to evaluating the desirability of diversification efforts
is a substantial and solid body of evidence, accumulated over decades,
that steps taken to achieve greater racial balancing in the workplace
can carry costs that result from the hiring and promotion of less
competent employees. Studies by industrial and organizational
psychologists have long revealed that qualifications, skills, experience,
interests, abilities, and educational credentials vary significantly
across racial and ethnic groups in American society, with Blacks and,
to a lesser extent, Hispanics lagging on average behind Whites and
Asian Americans on parameters that predict job performance. This
See generally Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Code
(2000) (telling the stories of the men who cracked the Enigma code).
2
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means that increasing the presence of Blacks and other
underrepresented minorities virtually always requires accepting lower
hiring standards and relaxing well-established, meritocratic selection
criteria. Because many common personnel screens employers have
adopted have been shown to predict productivity and performance,
altering them can result in a less capable workforce that can impose
costs on firms and organizations. Among the industrial experts who
study workplace productivity, this pattern is known as the validitydiversity trade-off. The data show also that negative effects become
more pronounced as jobs become more selective, competitive, and
demanding of high-level skills, because the paucity of workers from
less qualified groups at those levels becomes more pronounced.
These documented realities are, and should be, pertinent to the
legal bona fides of race-conscious employment initiatives. As a general
rule, companies pledged to pursue racial “equity” either downplay or
ignore costs to the enterprise associated with diversity efforts and
many would bristle at the suggestion, or at least at the open
acknowledgment, that any trade-offs exist between hiring greater
numbers of underrepresented minorities and an employer’s effective
operation and organizational interests. The trade-offs, however, are
real. Although the balance of costs and benefits will vary somewhat
across different occupations and economic sectors, present racial and
ethnic differences in educational achievement, qualifications, and
skills mean that negative effects will exist, and especially for highly
selective and sophisticated positions. Courts charged with deciding
whether diversity in employment serves a “compelling” interest or any
legitimate interest at all should not allow employers to sidestep the
possibility of these effects. They should force employers to account for
both downsides and upsides, costs as well as benefits, of the raceconscious measures they adopt. More specifically, any legal
assessment should consider how race-conscious organizational
practices affect merit-based hiring, job-related qualifications
demanded for particular positions, and the changes in customary
criteria for staffing and hiring. A critical and searching look at the
impact of these parameters on the employing organization should be
an essential part of any inquiry.
To be sure, affirmative action in the educational setting likewise
carries costs, which are routinely minimized or simply denied.
Competitive universities must ordinarily relax their customary
academic standards, at least for some students, to achieve the diversity
they seek. The consequences of that adjustment, however, are much
debated. Whether universities can accomplish their central mission
despite the presence of some groups of students who are less
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academically proficient is a complex question that admits of no
straightforward answer. In contrast, the use of race-conscious
personnel methods for the purpose of increasing workplace diversity is
a far simpler matter. Defending that practice would appear difficult, if
not impossible, if it fails to advance legitimate business interests or
entails a sacrifice of firm productivity, efficiency, or effectiveness.
Absent concrete and demonstrable benefits, a firm’s desire to socially
engineer a workplace that “looks like America” for its own sake should
not count as an acceptable reason to deviate from the colorblind
mandate expressly written into the law. Likewise, judges should not
uncritically accept the oft-heard assertion that increasing workplace
diversity enhances an organization’s ability to serve its minority
clients more effectively. For instance, Black and other minority health
care workers are claimed to generate superior outcomes for patients
from underserved groups. These statements are easy to make but
hard to prove, and their validity should not be assumed. Yet another
reason employers give for pursuing diversity is to cater to customers or
clients who prefer to do business with companies that employ a
demographically varied workforce. Courts have traditionally rejected
customer preference as grounds for departing from race neutrality, and
there is a long history of minority exclusion on that basis. They should
likewise be reluctant to permit employers to justify affirmative action
from similar motives. That such demands might be made for idealistic
reasons or based on political convictions should carry no weight.
Pursuing diversity for its own sake or because clients, managers, or
other important and influential people regard it as appealing,
desirable, or “the right thing to do,” cannot be allowed to overcome the
explicit legal protections against discrimination written into Title VII.
In sum, it should be incumbent on organizations that adopt raceconscious methods to show that their hiring practices actually advance
their core mission and legitimate business purposes. Other rationales
should not suffice.
CONCLUSION
There are at least two potential impediments to the courts taking a
harder line on race preferences in the workplace than for education.
First, the prohibition on making employment decisions “because of”
race or other protected categories in Title VII, which can ground
complaints of employers’ unlawful disparate treatment, has also given
rise to the doctrine of disparate impact, which imposes liability for
employment practices that produce deviations from proportional group
representation without an affirmative demonstration of “business
necessity.” An employer faced with making that showing has an
incentive to use race-conscious methods (that is, to act “because of”

10/30/20 U. Chi. L. Rev. Online *108

race) to achieve proportional representation, thus escaping the
presumption of liability. Because the disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact doctrines potentially subject employers to conflicting
demands, allowing employers to cite the goal of diversity to justify
race-conscious selection would enable the courts to ease the tensions
between the two. The temptation to grant that permission should be
resisted. A better and more realistic course would be to curtail
disparate-impact liability or abolish it altogether. The latter would
require congressional action in light of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which
validates the disparate-impact discrimination doctrine articulated in
Griggs v. Duke Power (1971). Even without any significant change in
the positive law, however, the courts have considerable leeway to
revise judicially crafted aspects of the doctrine by adopting more
flexible and less stringent standards for disparate-impact liability. As
I have argued elsewhere, the courts should abandon the unreasonable
expectation that all groups will be represented proportionately
throughout the workforce and instead should rely more heavily on data
showing the actual profile of ability, talents, interests, and
qualifications for different groups. The disparate-impact doctrine
should be modified to negate the presumption of liability for the broad
range of numerical imbalances that are to be expected in light of these
group differences.
Another possibility is that employers who face challenges to overtly
race-conscious efforts to hire more underrepresented workers could
revert to defending their practices as a remedy for past societal
discrimination, which is a rationale that the Supreme Court has
sometimes accepted, albeit implicitly, as a basis for voluntary
affirmative-action programs such as the one at issue in Weber.
Although the courts have mostly disfavored vague and open-ended
invocations of generalized discrimination as the basis for raceconscious initiatives, that rationale has not been definitively
repudiated. The courts could choose to breathe new life into
affirmative action as a corrective for “societal discrimination” by
invoking the now popular and pervasive parlance of “systemic” and
“structural” racism. Reviving and broadening the remedial project,
which lies closer to the core of the civil-rights laws’ purposes than the
pursuit of diversity, is a doctrinally tempting way to sidestep the
empirical weaknesses of the diversity justification in the employment
context. But the courts should firmly reject that ploy, however
fashionable at the moment, as an unwarranted and ungrounded end
run around longstanding principles of remedial fairness. In contrast to
claims of specific and defined instances of discrimination, allegations
based on “systemic” or “structural” racism make use of imprecise,
unsubstantiated, and protean categories that are subject to ready
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manipulation for partisan purposes. Such concepts tend to corrode
impartial meritocratic principles and can be deployed indefinitely to
the disadvantage of social groups, such as White males, that become
disfavored or targeted by politically powerful factions. If anything, the
Supreme Court should use any challenges to aggressive workplace
initiatives grounded in the rhetoric of “structural racism” as
opportunities to narrow rather than expand the reach of Weber, which
not only flies in the face of the express language of Title VII, but flouts
longstanding requirements of proof of actual legal violations and
specific findings of liability before remedial measures can be
implemented under Anglo-American law.
Whether courts will be confronted with any of these issues depends
critically on whether and to what extent the newly articulated and
widespread promises to pursue workplace “equity” are actually kept,
and whether and what kind of legal challenges are brought to these
practices. These issues remain to be resolved in the future.
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